In this paper we examine the nexus between product markets and the legal system. We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm-level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability-related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorilyestablished limits on awards. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels to what a planner would choose. We consider two planners, one of whom is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given, and one of whom can control both safety effort and output. We argue that the former type of planner is the better representative of what the tort system might do if faced with deciding upon a safety effort standard.
Introduction
In this paper we examine the nexus between product markets and the legal system. We do this in the context of product safety, harm, and tort law. Firms' decisions regarding investment in activity directed towards improving product safety depend on both market-provided incentives and incentives provided by the tort system. Attributes of the market and of the technology that affect these decisions include the number of firms in the industry, the degree of substitutability between products, and the relationship between improved safety and production costs, as well as the relationship between improved safety and the likelihood and extent of harm. In particular, we show how the interplay of oligopolistic market structure and technological considerations alter results previously derived for monopolistic or perfectly competitive industries. Attributes of the tort system that affect safety effort decisions include the extent to which firms are held liable for the harms caused by their products, and the costs associated with litigation. In particular, we show how consideration of the extent and nature of externalities associated with third-party harms may further amplify, or ameliorate, losses arising due to the aforementioned oligopoly-generated inefficiencies.
The topic of product quality has been addressed in both the industrial organization and law and economics literatures. The industrial organization literature considers quality provision in a market, where quality is the result of an effort level that affects both fixed and variable costs. In principle, quality can affect both demand and production cost in arbitrary ways. Spence (1975) shows that, for a given output level, a monopolist will over-(under-) provide quality if higher quality increases (decreases) the slope of the inverse demand curve. compares a monopolist to a social planner who chooses both quality (interpreted as safety) and output. Strict liability fully-insures consumers, and hence safety does not affect the demand curve. He finds that a monopolist provides the socially optimal level of safety effort for a given level of output.
However, since the monopolist always produces too little output, the monopolist over- (under-) provides safety if an increase in safety increases (decreases) combined marginal production and liability costs. 1 This literature emphasizes the direct influence of quality on consumer demand, and abstracts from spillovers to third-parties, which are frequently important when the quality dimension is safety.
The standard law and economics analysis (Shavell 1980 (Shavell , 2004 of the market provision of safety under strict liability assumes that safety effort involves a constant expenditure per unit of output and that litigation is not costly. 2 In this case, the determination of safety effort is separable from that of output and, since the firm faces the social cost of harm, the firm is induced to choose the socially-optimal level of care. The market may be perfectly competitive (so output is also socially optimal) or imperfectly competitive (so output is under-supplied). Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the victims of harm are the firm's consumers or third parties.
In this paper, we generalize these two literatures to provide a more comprehensive model of how markets and the tort system interact to affect the equilibrium provision of output and safety.
We generalize the industrial organization literature by considering a Cournot oligopoly in which firms produce horizontally-differentiated products which are (potentially) vertically-differentiated by a safety attribute as well. To our knowledge, such a Cournot oligopoly model with both horizontally-and vertically differentiated goods has not been considered to date. 3 In this case, product failure results in harm to the consumer and potentially also to third parties. For many products, the set of victims will consist of consumers alone, or a combination of consumers and third parties, as in cigarette smoking and automobile accidents. For others, the set of victims may consist only of third parties, whose harm is merely incidental to consumption, as in individuals who are harmed by a spill which occurs when gasoline is transported to its point of consumption. We assume that compensation is determined by the tort system, rather than by ex ante contracting between the firm and a consumer. In the case of injury, a firm cannot limit its liability for a consumer's harm through contractual means. On the other hand, under the penalty doctrine, the common law does not enforce stipulated damages in excess of expected damages (Rea, 1998, p.24) . Moreover, there is no possibility of contract with third parties. Thus, it is appropriate to treat compensation as the outcome of the legal process. Since the legal process sometimes involves asymmetric information and bargaining breakdown, compensation will be costly and incomplete. Although consumers have the ability to shift these costs back to the firms via the product's price, third parties have no such opportunity. Furthermore, we generalize the law and economics literature by incorporating a significant, endogenously-determined, fixed-cost component of safety effort, as would arise when safety can be improved through investments (e.g., in R&D), such as in automobiles and pharmaceuticals. In this case, the output and safety effort decisions are not separable. Also in contrast with the law and economics literature, we consider a variety of imperfectly competitive market structures and show how the number of firms and the degree of product substitutability influence both the market provision, as well as the socially efficient levels, of safety and output.
We first consider the victims-as-consumers (that is, two-party) model. We find that imperfectly competitive firms always provide too little output for any given level of safety effort.
We examine two measures of product variety using a heterogeneous-goods oligopoly model: the number of firms, and the degree of substitutability of the products. Holding the degree of substitutability constant, an increase in the number of firms always reduces equilibrium safety effort.
On the other hand, holding the number of firms constant, increasing the degree of substitutability first decreases, but ultimately increases, the equilibrium safety effort (though the equilibrium safety effort for goods that are perfect substitutes is still lower than the monopoly level). An increase in a firm's safety effort has two effects: a direct effect (it lowers the firm's variable costs) and an indirect effect (it induces a reduction in rival firms' output). When the products are poor substitutes, the first effect dominates, while the second effect dominates when the products are good substitutes, providing a number of results not encompassed by the literature which emphasizes either monopolistic or perfectly competitive markets.
We compare equilibrium safety effort and output with two social benchmarks which vary in the extent to which the industry is controlled. A restricted social planner can choose safety effort, but is constrained to allow firms to make their own output decisions; thus, the planner takes the market equilibrium determination of output as given. This planner thereby specifies the socially optimal level of safety much as a social-welfare maximizing court system would, since courts involved in tort actions generally do not penalize firms for under-supply of output. In this case, we find that non-cooperative firms under-provide safety effort (relative to the restricted social planner's preferred level) when the products are relatively poor substitutes. However, when the products are sufficiently good substitutes, the non-cooperative firms will over-provide safety effort. Moreover, the more firms there are in the industry, the less substitutable their products need to be in order for the equilibrium to result in over-provision of safety effort. We also consider a less restricted social planner who can choose both safety effort and output. The comparison of equilibrium safety effort with the less restricted social planner's preferred level is qualitatively similar to the previous analysis, although there are minor quantitative differences. Thus this means that the market almost never provides the socially optimal level of safety (in contrast with the traditional argument), and there is a broad set of conditions under which it over-or under-produces safety. Furthermore, by incorporating imperfect competition into the analysis we can see how product variety, and the intensity of strategic interaction, influence the efficiency of safety provision in the market.
Next, we add third-party victims to the model by assuming that consumption exposes a certain number of third parties per consumer to potential injury. We find that the market with thirdparty victims behaves in a qualitatively similar way with respect to our two measures of product variety. Moreover, we find that equilibrium safety effort is increasing in the intensity of spillovers when (and only when) the firm's total liability costs for third-party harms are diminished by an increased safety effort. This occurs when the magnitude of the (pre-transaction) elasticity of market output with respect to safety effort is less than that of the (post-transaction) elasticity of the firm's per-unit third-party liability costs. When we compare the equilibrium safety effort with what would be chosen by our two versions of a social planner, we find conditions under which greater (or lesser)
substitutability is required to yield over-supply of safety effort in equilibrium. That is, we identify conditions under which the presence of third-party victims increases (or decreases) the set of parameters in which equilibrium safety effort will be inefficiently low. Furthermore, unlike the twoparty case wherein a welfare-maximizing court would prefer a level of safety below that of an unconstrained social planner, with third-party harm, the court's preferred level may actually exceed the unrestricted planner's choice. Interestingly liability for third-party harms may lead to benefits for direct-product consumers; this occurs when such liability induces firms to improve safety.
Finally, we delve into the details of the settlement subgame that generates the respective losses borne by the firm and the injured parties. We consider how various policies, such as promoting alternative dispute resolution, imposing caps on damages awards, or increasing evidentiary standards affect the allocation of the cost of harm between the victim and the injurer, the extent of settlement, and the overall level of costs due to settlement failure. Alternative dispute resolution (such as arbitration or mediation) is viewed as a way of reducing the costs of adjudication, reserving the full-blown (and often very costly) trial process for relatively fewer cases. Although lowering the cost of adjudication has an adverse effect on the likelihood of settlement, overall expected litigation costs are lower when the costs of adjudication are lower. Tort reform has been an on-going policy question of importance which, as of this writing, is heating up again. Many reformers argue for increased evidentiary standards (e.g., by shifting class actions from state to federal court), and caps on damages awards; see, for example, VandeHei (2002) , Ballard (2003), and Caher (2003) . Both of these reforms reduce the plaintiff's expected recovery, and both promote settlement. Thus, these three policies all reduce the expected costs of the legal system. However, we find that changes in these policies that increase the expected costs of the legal system can, in some circumstances, have a beneficial effect upon social welfare.
Plan of the Paper
In Section 2 we provide the basic elements of our model, including safety effort investment, manufacturing costs and liability-related losses for the firm. We also specify a model of consumer choice which incorporates the consumer's utility for the product and for product variety, and their disutility for uncompensated harms they may bear. Section 3 analyzes a product-differentiated oligopoly in which firms first choose safety effort levels and then choose output levels. In this section, we focus on the two-party case, wherein the victims of harm are the product's consumers.
Section 4 considers the two types of social planners and compares the socially optimal levels of safety effort and output with those in the market equilibrium. Section 5 extends our analysis to include third-party harms. Section 6 expands the analysis by tracing the effects of potential changes in tort law on market incentives. Section 7 summarizes our results and discusses their implications.
An Appendix provides much of the technical analysis.
Model Setup, Structure and Notation
Preliminaries: Firms, Consumers and Social Planners
Consider an industry comprised of n firms, with each firm producing a (possibly differentiated) product. Differentiation here will be in terms of safety and some other (parametrically fixed) attribute to be discussed in greater detail below. N identical consumers buy these products and some consumers suffer harms; the degree of harm can be different for each consumer and is their private information. Assuming firms are strictly liable for the harm they cause, those consumers who are harmed bring suit seeking compensation. 4 We assume that suits are costless to file and to negotiate, but resorting to trial is costly. We follow the American rule and assume that each party pays their own trial costs if trial occurs. At trial a court perfectly discerns the true level of harm suffered and awards damages based on this harm. (C; xN) ; and ii) G(C; x) first-order stochastically dominates G(C; xN). Thus, for instance, one implication is that increases in the safety effort level result in a reduction in expected damages. We further assume that F (respectively, G) is continuous and differentiable, with density f (respectively, g). We also assume that the densities are strictly positive on their supports (which are taken to be non-degenerate intervals). Moreover, the lower end-points of the supports, denoted 2 for F and * for G, are such that 2 > 0 and * > k P and either or both are (possibly) functions of x. This means that perfect safety is not possible (2 cannot be zero, no matter how large x is) and that any consumer who is harmed has a credible strategy of proceeding to trial.
We focus on the case of strict liability in tort: if firm i's product has harmed a consumer, the firm is liable for the damages suffered (but not the consumer's court costs, if incurred). Each consumer derives utility from consuming the n goods in question as well as a numeraire good, and has a quasilinear utility function, U(q 1 , ..., q n ) + q n+1 , where good n + 1 is the numeraire good (i.e., it represents a composite of all other goods purchased by the consumer), with its price equal to1. In particular, we assume that U is quadratic in form, with parameters " > 0, $ > 0, and (:
where ( is the degree of product substitution between any two products in the class of interest. 7 We take ( to lie in the interval [0, $), with perfect substitutes being the limit case when ( 6 $. Note that if ( = 0, then each product is independent of each other product, and each firm has a monopoly in its product market. Thus, in the monopoly case we consider below, we take n = 1and let U(q) = "q -$q 2 /2, while for the oligopoly case, if the n firms produce a homogeneous good (that is, the limit case
This utility function implies that the consumer likes variety. In equilibrium, the consumer will purchase some of each good. Moreover, the more varieties there are (i.e., the larger is n), or the more different the varieties are (i.e., the smaller is (), the greater is the total quantity of goods in this class that the consumer will purchase. This is because each variety competes for the consumer's budget not only against other varieties of the same good, but against the numeraire good (i.e., all other goods) as well.
An example of a class of products that are imperfect substitutes with safety attributes is restaurant meals. Food storage and preparation equipment must be chosen and installed, food inspection and preparation protocols must be designed, and workers must be instructed in these protocols. These constitute investments (independent of output) that affect product safety, as they affect the likelihood that a consumer will become ill from a number of food-related illnesses that have been contracted from restaurant meals, such as those caused by salmonella, e. coli, listeria, and Hepatitis A. Thus, if restaurant meals are the good in question, this means that more variety in the restaurants on offer will result in a greater consumption of restaurant meals overall, at the expense of all other goods. Other examples of products that are imperfect substitutes with safety attributes include toys, pain relievers, prescription antibiotics, household cleaners, and modes of transportation.
Furthermore, although we will construct the demand curve for the products in the class of interest from the utility function of a representative consumer who prefers variety, one could alternatively simply assume a linear inverse demand curve for product i which arises from aggregating demands from consumers with diverse preferences. In this case, individual consumers need not demand some of each variety, so the model can be applied to differentiated-products markets such as those for automobiles, cigarettes and pharmaceuticals.
Consumers are rational and anticipate the effect of safety effort by each firm on the likelihood of harm as well the likely level of damages they will suffer. 8 As potential plaintiffs they know that if their realized damages are *, then incorporating settlement bargaining and possible litigation implies that their uncompensated losses will amount to L P (*; x). Therefore, consumers considering a purchase of good i recognize that they face a stochastic loss of 2 i L P (* i ; x i ) per unit, should (2 i , * i )
be the realized outcome. Thus, our model of the consumer is to choose (q 1 , ..., q n ) so as to maximize their expected utility of consumption net of the expenditure on the n goods (the consumption of all other goods is found as the residual):
where I is the consumer's income. Denote the expected loss for any given x (given a harm has occurred) as EL P (x) / IL P (*; x)g(*; x)d*. This loss is the expected harm, *(x) / I*g(*; x)d*, minus any transfer from the defendant due to settlement or trial, plus any court costs incurred. Since 2 and * are independent (conditional on x), the consumer's choice problem can be replaced by:
where u(x i ) / 2 (x i )EL P (x i ). Note that we expect that u x (C) < 0, but that u xx (C) > 0. Again, as with v(C),
we provide an example of a settlement subgame in the Appendix that exhibits these properties. Thus, for positive demands, the inverse demand function in our general case for product i is:
with the obvious simplifications for the monopoly and homogeneous oligopoly cases.
For any level of safety effort x, u(x) + v(x) is equal to the expected harm plus any inefficiencies that arise from failed bargaining (i.e., expected trial costs); transfers from D to P wash out of this sum. Expected trial cost, conditional on harm occurring, is the product of the trial costs that would be incurred by P and D should trial occur (K / k P + k D ) times the likelihood of trial;
denote the expected trial cost as ETC(x). We assume that ETC x (C) < 0 and ETC xx (C) > 0; in the Appendix we provide an example of a settlement game in which these assumptions hold.
In summary, we assume that n, N, x i , t, q i , F, G, m(x), U(q 1 , ..., q n ), the game form for the settlement bargaining model, k P and k D are (or become, in the case of simultaneously chosen variables) common knowledge, and we also assume that no consumer can "fake" being harmed.
There are two avenues along which firms may be differentiated, namely through x and (. Moreover, there are three avenues along which competition among firms can be increased, namely through increases in x, n and (. We shall take n and ( as exogenously-specified parameters, and x as endogenously determined. Competition itself will be captured by assuming that firms compete (noncooperatively) first by choosing safety effort levels; then, given knowledge of all firms' choices of these levels, they (non-cooperatively) choose output levels. Equilibrium levels of safety effort and output for firm i in an n-firm oligopoly will be denoted x i n and q i n , respectively; in the monopoly case we will denote the optimal choices of these variables as x 1 and q 1 , respectively.
Finally, we will be interested in the welfare-maximizing levels of safety and output, and we will consider two possible types of social planner. Since our main purpose is to understand the interaction of product markets with the tort system, we will consider a social planner who can set the level of safety effort, but cannot control either the level of output or the number of firms. Another useful benchmark is captured by considering a social planner who can set both safety effort and output. 9 We refer to the first type of planner as a restricted social planner (RSP) and the second type as an unrestricted social planner (USP). In the RSP case the optimal safety effort level will be denoted X nq and this will imply a (per customer) equilibrium level of output Q nq . In the USP case, the optimal levels will be denoted X n and Q n . Thus, the use of capital letters is to remind the reader that the variables are being determined by a social welfare maximizer while the superscripts serve to remind the reader about which variables are taken as given (uncontrolled) by the planner.
Social and Private Safety and Production Costs
The sum u(
provides the expected post-production (per unit) costs given safety effort x; adding m(x) yields the "full marginal cost" per unit of output produced:
. This function plays a central role in the results to be developed below, so we wish to take a few moments to discuss its assumed properties.
Assumption 1 provides conditions that ensure that FMC is strictly convex and "U-shaped" and that the product in question is socially valuable even if there were no safety effort. Thus, there exists x
In the sequel we further assume that all derivatives of FMC (with respect to x and any parameters) are bounded for x 0 [0, x G ].
Market Provision of Safety and Output: The Two-Party Case
Profits for firm i for safety effort level x i and the vector of firm outputs (q 1 , ..., q n ) are:
The first term on the right is the firm's revenue at the market price. The second and third terms are variable production costs and safety effort costs, while the fourth term is the expected liability costs.
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Substitution of elements from the previous section allows us to write firm i's profit as:
In what follows we always assume that the profit function for firm i is strictly concave in (x i , q i ). Moreover, since effort levels are chosen prior to quantities, the subgame-perfect equilibrium quantity levels will be functions of the safety effort levels, and therefore we will assume that the reduced-form profits (as functions of the safety effort levels) are strictly concave in own safety effort.
Note that it is immediate from the profit function above that the firm faces the full marginal cost associated with the provision of the product; this is because consumers discount the value of the product by the likely costs that will be imposed due to a safety failure.
Monopoly Provision
If there is only one firm in the industry, then we can write the firm's profits as:
Maximizing with respect to output yields the monopoly output q 1 (x) = (" -FMC(x))/2$. Substituting into B(x,q) yields the reduced-form profit function B (x) / N(" -FMC(x)) 2 /4$ -tx. We maintain the following assumption to ensure that the firm's safety effort choice problem is well-behaved.
Assumption 2. B (x) is strictly concave in x for all x (with B xx < 0).
Maximizing B (x) with respect to x yields the following first-order condition for the firm's optimal safety effort, denoted x 1 :
Let:
An immediate implication of Assumption 2 is that H x < 0 for all x. Substitution of q 1 (x) into equation (1) and simplification implies that equation (1) can be re-written as H(x 1 ; a 1 ) = 0, where a 1 = 2$t/N.
Assuming that H(0; a 1 ) > 0, and noting that H(x G ; a 1 ) < 0, it follows from H x < 0 that there exists a unique solution x 1 0 (0, x G ). Thus, the profit-maximizing amount of safety effort is less than that which minimizes FMC(x).
We make this observation because standard theory in law and economics (see, for example, Shavell, 2004, or Cooter and Ulen, 2000) provides the result that, under strict liability, firms will choose the level of care that minimizes unit precaution costs plus unit expected losses from harm, FMC(x). Obviously this doesn't hold here because we have included an endogenously-determined level of fixed costs (tx 1 ) as part of the firm's cost function. Finally, as an alternative interpretation, using the fact the FMC(x) / m(x) + u(x) + v(x), we can re-write equation (1) above as:
Since u x < 0, the left-hand-side is positive. This is the effect on revenue brought about by an increase in x. Because increasing x reduces the consumer's expected loss from harm, this increase affects their willingness to pay. On the right-hand-side above is the impact on items which are purely cost effects: the direct safety effort cost, tx 1 , production costs, Nq 1 m(x 1 ), and direct expected liability costs, Nq 1 v(x 1 ). Thus, equation (3) provides the familiar balancing of marginal revenue and the firm's marginal cost (due to adjustment of the safety level).
Oligopoly Provision
If there are n firms in the industry, firm i's profit function is as shown earlier:
As indicated at the beginning of Section 2, we assume that all n firms (simultaneously and noncooperatively) choose individual levels of safety effort, x i , i = 1, ..., n, which then become common knowledge for all, and then the n firms (simultaneously and non-cooperatively) choose their output levels, q i , i = 1, ..., n. Thus, finding the Cournot equilibrium for the output level stage conditional on the vector of safety efforts, the first-order condition for firm i's choice of q i is:
Solving for the equilibrium (per consumer) quantities, we obtain:
Substituting this equilibrium output level (which is a function of the n safety levels, suppressed so as to simplify exposition) into the profit function for firm i, the first-order condition for firm i for choosing x i (given any conjectured vector of choices of safety levels for the other n firms) is:
We can re-write (5) (1), the first-order-condition for safety effort for a monopolist; it differs by the fact that the quantity, q n i , is for an oligopolist, not a monopolist. By construction, this is the marginal effect on i's profit that is directly associated with increasing safety effort; we refer to this term as the "direct effect" of safety effort on profit, since increases in safety effort both reduce the firm's costs and increase the consumer's willingness to pay. The term in the second set of braces is absent from (1); this term reflects the effect of an increase in x i on the equilibrium output levels for all the other firms in the industry. Recalling the first-order condition for q n i above (i.e., equation (4)
, so that the term in the second set of braces is positive. This "indirect effect" on marginal profits is a spillover from the presence of the other firms: if firm i increases x i , all the other firms decrease their equilibrium output levels, shifting demand in the direction of firm i by the amount shown in the braces. 14 
Symmetric Safety Effort in Oligopoly Equilibrium
If we let x n / x n 1 = x n 2 = ... = x n n , then the subgame-perfect equilibrium quantities (upon substitution) are:
and the equilibrium x n is given implicitly by:
Let a n = (t/N)(2$ - (7) can be rewritten as H(x n ; a n ) = 0. Since dx n /da n = 1/H x and H x < 0, if we let y denote t, N, $, (, or n, then dx n /dy = (1/H x )(Ma n /My), so that sign(dx n /dy) = -sign(Ma n /My). While gruesome, computation yields:
, and dx n /dn < 0. The first four effects are the same (in sign) as in the monopoly case; the fifth effect arises due to the presence of other firms. This means that the greater the variety (measured by the number of firms, n) the lower will be the market share of each firm and the lower will be the equilibrium safety effort taken by any single firm.
Another effect that arises due to the presence of other firms concerns exogenous changes in (, a different measure of variety; this effect is not monotonic. The effect of ( on x n is first negative, but eventually positive: there exists a ( Figure   1 below illustrates the effect of ( and n on x n (note that we have illustrated this effect as convex; in fact we only know the curves to be first declining and then rising). Note that when n = 1 or (for all n) when ( = 0, the equilibrium safety effort is that provided by the monopolist (x 1 ), which is shown on the left axis, as is the value x G , the level of safety effort that minimizes FMC(x). Thereafter, x n initially declines as ( increases, reaches a minimum at ( For convenience, we summarize the symmetric equilibrium in Proposition 1 below. Proposition 1. In the n-firm symmetric safety effort equilibrium (with no third parties):
and is increasing in N and ", and decreasing in t, $, n, and ( (for ( < ( min ).
ii) safety effort at each firm, x n , is defined (implicitly) by
and is increasing in N, " and ( (for ( > ( We now consider the socially optimal level of safety effort and output. We formulate the problems faced by two alternative planners: the restricted social planner (RSP) and the unrestricted social planner (USP). Neither planner can control the number of firms, but RSP chooses the level of safety, taking the firms' non-cooperative equilibrium choices for output (conditional on safety level) as given, while USP chooses the levels of both safety and output.
RSP and USP maximize social welfare, allowing for n firms and maintaining strict liability for harm. Thus, RSP's problem is:
.., X n ), i = 1, ..., n} (8) while USP's problem is:
In what follows we restrict attention to the symmetric solution. Let (X nq , Q nq ) solve RSP's problem and let (X n , Q n ) solve USP's problem. The first-order conditions for the two problems yield the following equations for the RSP and USP quantities:
The associated RSP and USP safety effort levels are implicitly defined by:
H(X nq ; A nq ) = 0, where A nq = (t/N)(2$ + (n-1)() 2 /(3$ + (n-1)();
H(X n ; A n ) = 0, where A n = (t/N)($ + (n-1)().
Note that A nq > A n for each ((, n), which means that USP chooses a higher level of safety effort than does RSP: X n > X nq . Thus, RSP prefers a lower level of safety effort than does a "broader" social planner (USP), because RSP anticipates inefficiently low output. Moreover, since both A n and A nq are monotonically increasing in ( and in n, both X n and X nq are monotonically decreasing in ( and in n (for ( > 0). Finally, from the definitions of A n and A nq it is evident that X n and X nq are both increasing in N (and ") and decreasing in t and $.
Comparisons Between the Restricted Planner's Choices and the Equilibrium Oligopoly Outcomes
First, we compare x n with X nq and q n with Q nq . By definition, for any fixed level of safety effort, Q nq (x) = q n (x). Thus, the socially optimal and the equilibrium output levels are different only to the degree that the socially optimal and equilibrium safety effort levels are different: q n (x n ) At this point, the equilibrium safety effort produced by the n-firm oligopoly is the same as the restricted social planner would have chosen. 17 Note that ' nq ($, 2) = $, so that the socially optimal level of safety effort exceeds that provided by a duopoly except when the goods are homogeneous, in which case the duopolists provide exactly the socially optimal level of effort. However, when n > 2, then ' nq ($, n) < $, so that there is a set of (-values such that the n-firm oligopoly over-supplies safety. Also, since M' nq ($, n)/Mn < 0, the set of (-values wherein x n exceeds X nq increases as n increases: with more firms, progressively weaker degrees of product substitution still result in a market equilibrium level of safety effort that is in excess of the (RSP) socially optimal level.
Comparisons Between the Unrestricted Planner's Choices and the Equilibrium Oligopoly Outcomes
Similarly, let us compare x n and q n with X n and Q n . Comparing (11) and (6), it is immediately clear that, for any fixed level of safety effort, q n (x) < Q n (x). Comparing the solutions to (7) and (13) Γ n (β, 3)
amounts to comparing a n and A n . Once again, from the properties of H we know that x n > < X n if and only if A n > < a n . Some tedious algebra shows that, when n = 2, A n < a n for all values of (, and thus that X n > x n for all values of ( when n = 2. However, for n > 3, A n > < a n as (
equates A n and a n . ' n ($, n) provides the value of ( wherein the function describing X n just crosses that for x n ; at this point, the equilibrium safety effort produced by the n-firm oligopoly is the same as the unrestricted social planner would have chosen. It can be shown that there is a unique ' n ($, n) 0 (0, $) for all n > 2 and that M' n ($, n)/Mn < 0. Thus, a result similar to that under RSP holds: the set of (-values wherein x n exceeds X n increases as n increases.
Summary of Welfare Results
Our results are illustrated in Figure 2 below (the restricted planner's solution is illustrated on the left); note that, while illustrated as convex, the solid curves for X nq and X n need not be convex, just monotonically decreasing. We summarize the analysis of RSP and USP, and the comparisons with the market equilibrium outcomes, in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2.
i) For any given ((, n), the restricted planner chooses a lower level of safety than the unrestricted planner: X n > X nq . Moreover, X n and X nq are both decreasing in t, $, ( and n (for ( > 0), and increasing in N and ". iii) With respect to the unrestricted planner's level of safety, firms in market equilibrium under-supply safety if and only if ( < ' n ($, n); otherwise they over-supply safety . ' n ($, n) 0 (0, $) for all n > 2 and M' n ($, n)/Mn < 0. Moreover, when firms under-supply safety they under-supply output as well.
Market Equilibrium and Social Optimality in the Three-Party Case Preliminaries: Model Modifications
We now extend our analysis to consider safety effort and output choice when use of a product by consumers of a firm leads to harms suffered by non-consumers. We again focus on the symmetric solution (in safety effort and quantities) and we assume that bilateral precaution (in particular, by each firm's consumers) is not possible. Thus, for example, in the well-known Pinto case (see Viscusi, 1991) , owners of Pintos, and of cars that had collisions with them, were harmed due to a design flaw (placement of the gas tank) rather than due to the owner's poor driving. As an alternative example, in Daughety and Reinganum (2002) , we discussed lawsuits against Conoco for leakage of gasoline from their gas station storage tanks into water tables near approximately fifty communities nationwide. In that case, customers of the gas station were not harmed, but local residents (who need not be customers) were affected by the ongoing operation of the gas stations; moreover, there were no precautions consumers of gasoline could have taken to lessen the harm to non-consumers.
To formalize this, we again assume there are N consumers of the products provided by the n firms, but now assume that each consumer's per-unit consumption of the product exposes N others to the risk of harm; that is, let N > 0 be the (exogenously-determined) exposure rate, or "technology" of spillover of harms to non-consumers from consumers. Then the number of non-consumers of firm i's product that are at risk is NNq i . Let the expected per-unit loss for a non-consumer associated with harms from firm i's product be denoted ũ(x i ). Note that this implicitly allows us to employ alternative distributions, F and G , for the likelihood of harm occurring and for the consequent likely damages; we assume that they have properties similar to F and G stated earlier. Thus, we expect ũ x (C) < 0 and ũ xx (C) > 0, in correspondence to our earlier assumptions on u(C). Similarly, let ṽ(x i ) be firm i's expected per-unit cost arising from liability for harms to a non-consumer, with ṽ x (C) < 0 and ṽ xx (C) > 0. Let the full marginal costs per unit faced by the firm be FMC f (x i ) / FMC(x i ) + Nṽ(x i ).
Note that social per-unit costs, FMC
reflect production costs plus expected harms suffered by consumers and by non-consumers, as well as losses the litigants face due to any inefficiencies in the settlement and litigation subgame.
In other words, ignoring the safety effort costs tx i , the perunit cost-minimizing level of safety effort in the two-party case is less than a firm would choose in the three-party case, which is less than what USP would choose in the three-party case. Finally, we further assume that the properties of FMC carry over to FMC f and FMC S .
Market Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
Denote the dependence of FMC f on N by FMC f (x; N); note that FMC f N (x; N) = ṽ(x) > 0 and FMC f xN (x; N) = ṽ x (x) < 0. Thus, an increase in N increases the firm's full marginal cost, but an increase in safety effort, x, can mitigate this effect. With a slight abuse of notation, we again consider the symmetric equilibrium and denote a firm's output level as q n and its safety effort as x n , which leads to equations analogous to (6) and (7) above, with q n (x n ; N) given by: q n (x n ;N) = (" -FMC f (x n ; N))/(2$ + (n-1)(), (14) and the equilibrium x n given (implicitly) by:
Therefore, in a manner similar to that employed in Section 3, it can be shown that dx n /dt < 0, dx n /dN > 0, dx n /d$ < 0, dx n /d" > 0, and dx n /dn < 0. Further, since ( min , the turning point for each of the curves displayed in Figure 1 above, is a function only of $ and n, a diagram similar to Figure   1 would illustrate the market equilibrium safety effort levels in the three-party case. In fact, the turning points would occur at exactly the same values of (, so dx In what follows, we will be especially interested in the effect of changes in N on both the equilibrium quantity of the product provided and on the equilibrium level of safety investment made. This is because there are two avenues by which the spillover of harm from consumption can be influenced: via changes in the amount of the good sold and via changes in the level of safety provided. Of course, as both q and x change, this feeds back and affects the consumers of the product as well. Since N influences FMC f directly and via its effect on x n , differentiating (14) yields:
x (x n ; N) < 0. Thus, it follows that if dx n /dN < 0, then dq n /dN < 0; that is, if an increase in N were to result in a reduction in the equilibrium investment in safety effort, then this would be accompanied by a decrease in the quantity of output produced.
As is shown in the Appendix (and suppressing arguments, but evaluating the expression at the equilibrium), dx n /dN > 0 if and only if FMC 
Multiplying the denominator and numerator of the term ṽ x x n /ṽ by NN reveals that the resulting term in the absolute value is the elasticity of the firm's expected per-unit third-party liability costs with respect to an increase in the equilibrium safety level. Since ṽ x < 0, this elasticity is negative so that an increase in safety effort reduces these expected costs. The second term, q n x x n /q n , is the elasticity of the subgame-perfect equilibrium output with respect to x n . Note that increases in x n result in increases in equilibrium q n ; this partially offsets the liability reduction due to an increase in safety effort. Thus, if the liability-related costs are more responsive (in percentage terms) to safety effort adjustments than is the equilibrium output in the quantity subgame, the firm will choose to increase its safety investment in response to an increase in N. 18 An examination of the first-order-conditions for the firm from the earlier analyses indicates that x n 6 x G f for large N, large " and for small t. Since x n = x G f implies that q n x = 0, then it must be that dx n /dN > 0 and dq n /dN < 0; by continuity, this will also hold for x n close enough to x G f , due to large N, large " or small t. In this case, third-party harms will be reduced because the firm adjusts both instruments so as to reduce its overall exposure to liability for these losses: for t small, firms will now produce a smaller quantity of safer products.
On the other hand, if the expected per-unit liability costs are less responsive to changes in x than is the subgame equilibrium output, then the firm will reduce its safety investment when N increases. In this case, since dx n /dN < 0, so is dq n /dN: the firm reduces its overall exposure to liability by reducing output, but it also reduces the safety of the products sold.
Finally, note that an alternative to (16) can be shown to be the following: dx n /dN > 0 if and only if d(NNq n ṽ)/dx n < 0.
Thus, the response of the equilibrium level of safety to an increase in N will be positive if and only if increasing x n results in a reduction in overall liability costs for the firm associated with the negative externalities of their product.
We summarize the foregoing in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. In the n-firm symmetric safety effort equilibrium when there are third parties:
and is increasing in N and ", decreasing in t, $, n, and ( (for ( < ( min ).
and is increasing in N, ", and ( (for ( > ( min ), and decreasing in t, $, n, and ( (for ( < ( iii) Per-unit cost-minimizing safety effort (that is, at t = 0) increases relative to the two-party 
On the other hand, if output is more responsive (in percentage terms) than is the uncompensated harm of third parties, then the market will over-provide safety effort for a larger range of (-values.
Alternatively, and by the same process as used to produce (17), one can readily show that:
Thus, the market equilibrium under-invests in safety effort (for a larger set of (-values) in comparison with that level which RSP would choose if and only if increasing the level of safety effort would diminish total expected uncompensated losses for third parties.
Employing the elasticity versions, we consider what appear to be the two most plausible cases:
Case 1. |ṽ x x n /ṽ| > q n x x n /q n and |ũ x x n /ũ| > q n x x n /q n ;
Case 2. |ṽ x x n /ṽ| < q n x x n /q n and |ũ x x n /ũ| < q n x x n /q n .
In Case 1, equilibrium safety investment increases with third-party exposure and an increase in exposure (increasing N from zero) leads the market to under-supply safety effort for a larger range of (-values. An example of a product which might satisfy these conditions is retail gasoline, where a significant investment in safety effort involves the construction of the underground storage tank.
Greater investment in the form of better seals, and walls that are thicker or more resistant to earth movement will not affect (by much) the safety of the gas station relative to consumers, but will significantly reduce the harms to third parties caused by gas leaking into the nearby water table.
Moreover, if the choke price for gasoline (") is high, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium output elasticity will be small, and this case is likely to obtain.
In Case 2, equilibrium safety effort and output decrease with an increase in third-party exposure and an increase in exposure (increasing N from zero) leads the market to under-supply safety effort for a smaller range of (-values. In this case, RSP has seemingly perverse incentives to want a lower safety effort level than that provided by the market (for a greater range of (-values) because of the relatively high output-elasticity and relatively low responsiveness of third-party harm to safety effort. This is because higher x induces a substantial expansion in q, with relatively little reduction in third-party harm (per unit of output), making the increased use of safety effort counterproductive. Alternatively put, in this case a reduction in x (from the market equilibrium level)
would induce a substantial reduction in q, with relatively little increase in third-party uncompensated loss (per unit of output). Thus, the overall result is a reduction in third-party harm. Note that this indirect means of reducing third-party harm reflects RSP's inability to control q directly.
A product which might satisfy these conditions is a drug which may have some side effects that affect the consumer's well-being (and for which the relationship between safety effort and amelioration is understood), but which also has a rare side effect that can lead the consumer to harm a third party. It has been argued that the prescription sleeping pill Halcion has (on rare occasions) induced a paranoid reaction, sometimes resulting in homicide (see Myers, 1993 ). If this rare side effect is not responsive to safety effort (perhaps because its mechanism is poorly-understood), then the output-elasticity with respect to safety could well exceed those related to third-party harm.
Market Equilibrium and Social Optimality in the Three-Party Case when t is Small
The analysis above showed that market configurations (i.e., ( and n) which would result in over-investment in safety effort in the two-party setting (i.e., when ( > ' nq ($, n)) might now reflect under-investment if there were a negative externality associated with product consumption.
Moreover, since third-party harm depends upon both the level of safety effort and the level of output, but RSP can only adjust the safety level, this will mean that X nq is likely to differ from X n . In particular, one should expect there to be circumstances such that X nq exceeds X n . This is important because if RSP's choices resemble the decisions of courts determining whether "sufficient" safety effort was employed then employment of tort law (which generally is mute on the question of whether a defendant produced an appropriate level of output) may lead to standard setting that is yet greater than that which USP would have chosen, something that will never occur in the two-party case.
In this section we highlight this issue by focusing on circumstances wherein x n is close to x G f ; recall from above, this is associated with large N, large ", or small t. In what follows, we will take t = 0, discuss the resulting choices of x n , X nq , and X n , and then argue that (by continuity) qualitatively similar results will hold for t in a neighborhood of zero (or for t larger, but N or " sufficiently large).
When t = 0, it is immediate that x n = x G f and that X n = x G S . Since x G f < x G S , this means that x n < X n . Hence, from the perspective of USP, the market under-supplies safety effort. Under the assumption that t = 0, RSP's optimal safety effort level is implicitly defined by:
If (20) is evaluated at x G f , then FMC f x = 0 and the left-hand-side is positive, meaning that X nq > x G f .
Thus, when t = 0, the market always supplies too little safety from the perspective of RSP, independent of ( and n. Moreover, this means that FMC f x (X nq ) > 0. That is, RSP would prefer the small t as well (or sufficiently large " or N). Thus, at least when markets for the products are sufficiently large, or when per-unit safety effort cost is small, there is a substantial divergence between what the firm would choose to do in equilibrium, what courts might wish to impose as a standard for safety effort, and what a social planner with the ability to adjust both x and q would choose.
Implications of Tort Reform for the Equilibrium Safety Effort and Welfare
As was outlined in Section 2, harms (whether of consumers or third parties) result in lawsuits, which lead to settlement negotiations and, possibly, trial. Thus, policies that affect the settlement and litigation subgame can affect the equilibrium levels of safety effort, output and product price. In this section we summarize such a subgame (details are provided in the Appendix) and then examine the effect of three important parameters of the subgame on welfare.
The three parameters of interest are the total court costs incurred by the parties (K), the likelihood that P wins at trial (denoted as F) and the maximum allowed compensation (denoted as
. These parameters reflect the cost of adjudication (lower K means litigation is less costly), the evidentiary standard employed to find D liable (lower F is associated with a higher evidentiary standard, making it less likely that P will win) and "caps" on compensation (lower * max is associated with tighter caps on compensation, meaning a lower expected award at trial). Lower values of K, F and * max have the effect of lowering expected trial costs; interestingly, there are conditions under which increasing expected trial costs (via increases in K, F, or * max ) makes overall welfare increase.
It is traditional in this literature 19 to consider two possible forms for the one-sided incomplete information settlement bargaining game, one wherein P moves first and one wherein D moves first. 20 As described above, the game with P as first mover is a signaling game (since P has private knowledge of the level of damages, *) while the game with D as first mover is a screening game (since D is uninformed about the actual level of damages). 21 In such games trials occur with positive probability due to the presence of private information which cannot be verified in a costless manner.
The Appendix provides details of a signaling game wherein we have made specific functional form assumptions in order to provide sufficient structure to sign the relevant derivatives. 22 The
Appendix provides the equations for the expected trial costs given harm has occurred, ETC(x; K, F, * max ), the plaintiff's expected losses given a harm has occurred, EL P (x; K, F, * Although an increase in K encourages settlement, it also makes those cases that do proceed to trial more costly; on net, an increase in K raises total expected trial costs, as well as the trial-related costs borne by the defendant.
An increase in F or * max increases the value of the plaintiff's case, which ultimately raises total expected trial costs (as settlement occurs less often) as well as the defendant's expected liability costs. Thus an increase in any of these parameters will increase the firm's full marginal costs.
However, it can be shown that FMC bx < 0 and FMC Viscusi (1991) discusses the design flaw in the Pinto, wherein the company placed the gas tank only six inches in front of the rear bumper (that is, unusually close to the rear bumper); a modification that would have dramatically reduced the likelihood of a gas tank rupture would have cost $11 per car (Viscusi, 1991, p. 111) . This suggests that, in the case of the Pinto, the elasticity of the likelihood of harm with respect to safety effort is probably large, and thus that we might find in such a case that FMC Fx < 0. We now ask whether the policies discussed above (promoting alternative dispute resolution, which reduces K; increased evidentiary standards, which corresponds to reducing F; and caps on damages awards, which corresponds to reducing * max ) can increase welfare.
Let W(Q,X) be the planner's objective function:
To analyze whether increases in a b-parameter are welfare-enhancing, we evaluate this function at This derivative includes three terms. The first term is the product of dx n /db and RSP's first-order condition for safety effort (the term in square brackets), which is negative (positive) if x n > (<) X nq .
Since Mq n /Mb < 0, the second term above is negative (positive) if MW/Mq n > (<) 0 or, equivalently, if Q n (x n ) > (<) q n (x n ). Finally, the third term is always negative, since an increase in b increases full marginal social costs.
First, consider the two-party case. Since non-cooperative firms always produce too little output (for a given level of safety effort), both the second and third terms above are negative.
Moreover, the first term is also negative if x n > X nq and dx n /db > 0 (or if x n < X nq and dx n /db < 0).
Thus, for markets in which an increase in litigation costs increases safety effort (e.g., for sufficiently low t or sufficiently high N or ") and for which safety effort is already close to, or exceeds, what RSP would choose (e.g., for sufficiently large ( or n; see Figure 2 ), then proposed tort reforms (which would lower K, F or * max ) would be welfare-improving.
On the other hand, in the three-party case we have argued that x n < X nq is likely to hold in markets wherein the rate of exposure of third parties (or the resulting uncompensated loss) is sufficiently high (at least for sufficiently low t or sufficiently high N or ", in which case the elasticity condition in equation (18) holds). Thus, in the three-party case the term in square brackets in the expression for dW/db can readily be positive. Moreover, when the rate of exposure of third parties (or the resulting uncompensated loss) is sufficiently high, then non-cooperative equilibrium output can readily exceed the socially optimal output (that is, q n (x n ) > Q n (x n )), because the firm does not face the full marginal social cost (see the related discussion following Proposition 4). Thus, the first and second terms of dW/db can be positive, although the third term will always be negative.
Consequently, tort reforms that are welfare-enhancing in the two-party case can be welfare-impairing in the three-party case if third-party exposure or uncompensated harms are significant. Alternatively put, in the three-party case, increases in K, * max or F (all of which increase expected trial costs, and are in this sense "wasteful") are welfare-enhancing if they induce a sufficiently large increase in safety effort, and if the third-party spillovers are sufficiently important. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels with what a planner would choose. We consider two planners, one of whom is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given (RSP), and one of whom can control both safety effort and output (USP).
We argue that the restricted planner is the better representative of what the tort system might do if faced with deciding upon a safety effort standard. Thus, our analysis incorporates market and legal incentives and allows us to examine the interplay of these two mechanisms.
The presence of (endogenously determined) fixed costs associated with safety effort means that output and safety effort choices are interdependent. This results in distortions between the equilibrium and socially optimal levels of safety investment. Moreover, the levels of safety effort provided are affected both by the degree of substitutability of the products as well as the number of firms in the industry, a result not available from a model based on monopoly or perfect competition.
In the two-party case, when the degree of product substitution is low, the market provides too little safety, but when the degree of product substitution is sufficiently high, the market over-provides safety. Furthermore, as the number of firms (and substitutable products) increases, the minimal degree of substitution such that firms provide (at least) the socially optimal level of safety decreases, meaning that weaker substitutability of products still can lead to sufficient safety effort. When thirdparty harms are added to the analysis, this continues to hold as long as the degree of spillover is sufficiently small, but equilibrium safety effort is always inefficiently low for products with large spillovers. This difference is due to the fact that while a consumer's willingness to pay is influenced by the firm's safety effort, non-consumers do not enter the market, so their losses are not directly accounted for by the firm, which means that the distortion between equilibrium and optimality occurs even if the unit cost of safety effort is zero.
Thus, while the primary incentives for investment in safety effort come from the market in the two-party case, legal incentives play a greater role in the case wherein product consumption exposes third parties to harm. We show that firms that face liability for third-party harms will increase investment in safety effort in response to increases in the exposure rate when such increases reduce the firm's total losses due to settlement and litigation with third parties. Equivalently, this investment increases in response to the exposure rate as long as the magnitude of the elasticity of the firm's third-party liability costs (with respect to safety effort) exceeds the elasticity of per-consumer output (with respect to safety effort). Moreover, the restricted planner prefers that the firm increase its investment as long as such increases reduce third parties' total uncompensated losses due to harm, settlement and litigation with firms.
We found that, in general, USP and RSP disagree about the appropriate safety standard to set.
In the two-party case, RSP always sets the safety standard too low when compared with USP, while in the most significant third-party setting (high exposure rate, large third-party uncompensated losses or a large number of firms), RSP may set the safety standard too high when compared with USP. This is because RSP has direct control only over safety effort, which it then adjusts so as to indirectly manipulate output. Furthermore, this limitation on instruments means that a court, which is analogous to RSP, will not be able to properly pursue standard-setting (for example, if the legal regime involved a negligence regime instead of strict liability) unless it performs a full analysis of the product market (the number of firms, the nature of the oligopolistic interaction, the degree of product substitutability, etc.) along with an analysis of the costs of safety design and product manufacture. In order to achieve the full social optimum, the court would need to have the authority to adjust output standards, too. This would mean a substantial change in our current institutional design of the legal system. An alternative to the use of litigation is ex ante regulation of safety effort and output. Although agencies with these powers exist, they tend to have divided jurisdictions (some governing safety while others focus on output), while the problem calls for coordinated regulation.
Furthermore, the use of the tort system involves costs, sometimes very significant in size, and this has led to calls for changes in that system. Using a model of settlement bargaining under asymmetric information, we trace out how parameters that reflect trial costs, evidentiary standards or statutorily-imposed limits on compensation feed back to influence firm costs and welfare. We show that changes in those parameters that raise expected trial costs, and are welfare-impairing in the two-party case, can be welfare-enhancing in the three-party case, especially when externalities are substantial.
This suggests a rough-cut dividing line about the efficiency of proposed tort reforms, namely whether or not consumption of the product is likely to generate third-party harms. This line is "rough-cut" because even in the two-party case, Figure 2 illustrates how a small number of firms or a low degree of product substitution may mean that market incentives are too weak to encourage sufficient safety effort investment. Moreover, the model's analysis rests on the assumption that consumers are rational and will seek, and can effectively use, safety information.
The market for restaurant meals seems likely to provide safety effort of sufficient quality, since (1) people have the opportunity to become informed about restaurant-specific safety through local reputation and (often) publically-available health inspection reports; (2) the onset of illness from restaurant food is usually swift, and limited to the household (thus, this is essentially a two-party situation); (3) there are usually a significant number of restaurants that are relatively close substitutes, so competitive incentives for improved safety come into play. Jin and Leslie (2003) examined the use of posted restaurant hygiene information by consumers and found that the information was used by consumers when selecting a restaurant and that this led to improvements in hygiene by firms.
Thus (assuming that higher legal system costs would induce greater safety effort), policies that reduce the costs of the legal system would seem desirable in this context. To the extent that such policies shift losses to consumers, the consumer can shift them back through their willingness to pay.
On the other hand, we have also discussed how safety effort in the retail gasoline market may have its primary effect on third parties, rather than consumers. Insofar as safety affects customers, again a local reputation may be developed, but safety effort that affects third parties (such as storage tank design) is unobservable to consumers and third parties, is irrelevant to consumers, and third parties are unable to use the market to shift their costs back to the firms. This suggests that safety effort is likely to be lower than a restricted social planner would choose, and thus (again, assuming that higher legal system costs would induce greater safety effort) policies that reduce the costs of the legal system would exacerbate the under-provision of safety, particularly if these policies shift losses from firms to victims (as occurs under higher evidentiary standards and damages caps). The retail gasoline example shows how even the presence of a large number of firms with readily substitutable products may not be sufficient when negative externalities are substantial.
Tort reform is frequently posed in terms of victims versus injurers, with injurers the likely beneficiaries of, and victims the almost certain losers from, such reforms. Our analysis suggests that consumer-victims and injurers in markets with enough firms, product substitutability, and usable safety information, so that the equilibrium level of safety effort meets or exceeds the restricted social planner's desired level, would both benefit from reform. It also suggests that agents in those settings wherein this is not true would, at least in aggregate, be harmed by such reforms, and that this situation is most likely to occur when there are substantial spillovers, or just a few firms producing highly differentiated products. The bottom line is that sweeping, undifferentiated reform is unlikely to be uniformly welfare-enhancing.
is, the damages cap exceeds average damages. Following the analysis in Reinganum and Wilde (1986) , the equilibrium settlement demand is given by S = min{F*, F* max } + k D and the equilibrium probability of trial is given by r(*) = 1 -exp{-F(* -*)/K} for * < * max and r(*) = 1 -exp{-F(* max -*)/K} for * > * The bargaining model we have assumed allocates maximum bargaining power to the plaintiff, and thus it is technically possible (though implausible) for the plaintiff to expect to gain by being harmed (or by an increase in the combined cost of a trial, K). In order to ensure that EL P (x; K, F, * max ) > 0 (so the plaintiff does not expect to be over-compensated when harmed), we assume that ETC(x; K, F, * max ) -k D > 0. Taking k D = K/2, this can be guaranteed by assuming that F/:(x) > K and that the cap * max is sufficiently large (specifically, * max > * -[K/(F + :(x)K)]ln{(F -:(x)K)/2F}). When F = 1 and there is no cap, this reduces to 1/:(x) > K, which is very plausible, as it assumes that the average amount of damages in excess of * exceeds the combined costs of trial. We maintain the assumption F/:(x) > K in what follows. We will need to strengthen this assumption below in order to ensure that EL P (x; K, F, * max ) does not decrease with an increase in K (i.e., so that increases in K are borne, in part, by each party). Finally, EL D (x; K, F, * max ) = k D + F* + (F/:(x))(1 -exp{-:(x)(* max -*)}).
Under our maintained assumptions that * max > *(x) = * + 1/:(x) and F/:(x) > K, it is tedious but straightforward to show that ETC x < 0 and ETC xx > 0, as assumed in the text. In addition, (1) ETC K > 0 and ETC xK < 0; (2) ETC F > 0 and ETC xF > 0; and (3) ETC * max > 0 and ETC x* max < 0. It is worth verifying that the properties u x < 0, u xx > 0, v x < 0 and v xx > 0 hold for this example. It can be shown that EL Dx < 0 and EL Dxx > 0; and EL Px < 0 and EL Pxx > 0. Since v(x) = 2 (x)EL D (x), it follows that v x = 2 x EL D + 2 (x)EL Dx < 0 and v xx = 2 xx EL D + 22 x EL Dx + 2 (x)EL Dxx > 0, as assumed in the text. Similarly, since u(x) = 2 (x)EL p (x), it follows that u x = 2 x EL P + 2 (x)EL Px < 0 and u xx = 2 xx EL P + 22 x EL Px + 2 (x)EL Pxx > 0, as assumed in the text.
Other comparative static effects of EL D and EL P are: (4) EL DK > 0 and EL DxK = 0; (5) EL DF > 0 and EL DxF < 0; (6) EL D* max > 0 and EL Dx* max < 0; (7) EL PK > 0 (assuming F/:(x) > K/(2 1/2 -1) and the cap * max is sufficiently large) and EL PxK < 0; (8) EL PF < 0 and EL PxF > 0; and (9) EL P* max < 0 and EL Px* max > 0. Thus, both P and D suffer higher expected losses if the cost of a trial increases. An increase in F or * max , both of which shift losses from P to D (but also raise expected trial costs) end up, on net, increasing D's expected losses and decreasing P's expected losses.
Since FMC(x; K, F, * (10)- (12) (10)- (12) above).
